The logic behind this viewpoint is actually unfathomable but it goes like this. Deep down, Trump really wants this summit and so does Kim, so they both have an incentive to eventually meet. Of course Kim wants to meet with Trump. Sitting down in a face-to-fact meeting as an equal with the American President has been a goal of every North Korean leader since the end of the Korean War.
And of course the North Koreans were going to vehemently object to Bolton and Pence floating the "Libya option" if the North does not denuclearize, After all, that "option" means the annihilation of the Kim regime. But, after Trump's withdrawal, the North put out an extraordinarily restrained statement saying they were still willing to meet with Trump "at any time". And yesterday, he apparently asked for and got a meeting with Moon in an attempt to revive the summit.
But sitting down at that meeting does not mean Kim has any intention of giving up his nuclear weapons, which it seems clear he believes is his regime's literal life insurance policy. But something Kim might be willing to do is sign a peace treaty with the South and give up is his long range ICBMs which are the delivery vehicle that threatens the United States. In return, he would be looking for a withdrawal of US forces from the South and some economic aid.
So, for Kim, the reasons for his desire to have the meeting are clear. And his willingness to meet with Moon is also entirely consistent. Beyond keeping the détente between the North and the South going, with possible economic aid in return for reduced tensions, continuing to meet with Moon also advances Kim's aim of opening up a divide between the US and South Korea. And having a meeting between Kim and Moon where the US is not only not participating but an active part of the problem is exactly what Kim wants. Kim can now continually portray himself as the one willing to meet, making Trump more and more look like the one obstructing the meeting as well as looking more and more like the weaker party. In the end, however, Kim may want the summit with Trump but he certainly doesn't need it.
Trump's desire for the meeting has never been defined by any specific policy outcomes other than denuclearization. Rather, it seems, the reasons that Trump wants the meeting are primarily political. It seems clear he was drawn by the lure of "doing what no other President has done" and the possibility of the Nobel Peace Prize. In addition, the meeting provides a distraction from the Mueller investigation that is quickly closing in on him. More importantly, the polling on his handling of the North Korean issue has risen by 20 points and, until Thursday, was viewed favorably by a majority of the country. That, in turn, has driven up Trump's overall approval rating and probably helped bring the generic poll advantage for Democrats down considerably.
But the idea that this withdrawal was part of an eleven dimensional chess strategy by Trump is simply ludicrous. First of all, numerous reports indicate that Trump withdrew because he thought the North Koreans were going to withdraw first. And his letter, which reads like a teenage "I'm breaking up with you before you can break up with me" missive, is clear enough indication of that. More importantly, if, as the strategy theory postulates, Trump really still wants the meeting, then why didn't he just go ahead and have it. It's not like Kim is going to give him anything extra now in order to have the meeting. In fact, Trump isn't even asking for any new concessions in order to have the meeting.
The reality, of course, is that Trump is now in an even weaker position than he was last Wednesday. The South Koreans and the Chinese are no longer interested in exerting maximum pressure so our sanctions will have far less impact. And now Trump is clearly being looked at as the one who doesn't really want to have the meeting, as the obstacle to the desired peace on the peninsula, which is why we almost immediately saw Trump and his advisers start promoting the line that the summit may still take place sometime. Regardless of what happens now, if the summit does end up happening it will be Trump that will now be coming to the meeting looking like the supplicant, rather than Kim. Does anyone really think that is something that Trump would tolerate.
In a prior post, I've illustrated that Trump's seemingly "impulsive" foreign policy moves have been best explained by his racketeering mentality that has either extorted or accepted bribes. We have seen that play out in the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one side and Qatar and Iran on the other. We have seen that in Trump's interactions with Ukraine and China.
In fact, the two countries most invested in this summit and potential ratcheting down of tensions between North Korea and the US are probably South Korea and Japan, the two countries most directly threatened by Kim's nuclear capability. I find it hardly a coincidence that the very same day Trump withdrew from the summit he also impetuously and unexpectedly floated the idea of a 25% tariff on imported automobiles.
The media portrayed these tariffs as a threat to Canada and Mexico in the ongoing NAFTA renegotiations, which are now largely stymied over the auto issue. But Trump's threat was, in reality, meaningless in those negotiations. The Canadian foreign minister, Chrystia Freeland, called the national security rationale for these tariffs "frankly absurd". And the head of the US Chamber of Commerce declared "If this proposal is carried out, it would deal a staggering blow to the very industry it purports to protect and would threaten to ignite a global trade war". Because of the extortionist nature of the threat, it could be argued that it stiffens the resolve of Mexico and Canada over the auto issue and actually complicates the NAFTA renegotiations.
Once again, the media portrayed Trump's actions as being eleven dimensional chess in the NAFTA negotiations. But there is another equally acceptable explanation that fits in with the timeline of what was happening on Wednesday and Trump's pattern in sudden foreign policy decisions. South Korea and Japan are also countries that export a lot of cars to the US as well as build them in the US. The value of Japanese car exports to the US now stands at about $40 billion while the US market now accounts for almost 50% of South Korean car exports. South Korea has already been adversely effected by the voluntary quotas it imposed after the implementation of aluminum and steel imports.
There is no distance between the negotiating stance of the US and that of South Korea and Japan. Both those countries would prefer the denuclearization of North Korea. So the idea that these auto tariffs are bringing Japan and South Korean into line on North Korea is a non-starter. It might be plausible to claim that Trump is using this tactic to gain even more concessions on trade from these two countries knowing that they both want to see the summit with Kim go forward. But, based on what we have seen from Trump both before and since his inauguration, this looks like another simple extortion attempt for personal gain. If the summit actually occurs, I would not be surprised that we will find out at some later date that the Trump Organization received some money or beneficial treatment from South Korea and quite possibly Japan.
Trump does not play eleven dimensional chess. I sincerely doubt he even knows how to play regular chess. The only games Trump knows is PR and racketeering with expertise in extortion, bribery, and money laundering. The initial reaction to virtually anything Trump does should be at last initially treated though that prism.
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